While the world is busy with Ukraine, multiple parties are taking advantage in Syria by making tactical steps to ensure some gains on the ground. Within this context, the northeast of Syria forms the major point of conflict after ten years of war. It is not hard anymore to solve military and political problems locally in most areas, especially after the success of the settlement policy in the south that the government adopted with help of the Russian alley. However, it is not the case in the northeast. Controversies are up and down from time to time, but the main status is still hitting a deadlock. We will take a look at the basic contradictions which cause such deadlock and think about the possible intentions and interests of the conflict parties under the status quo.
The latest events: nothing new, but the atmosphere is different
Since the beginning of April, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the official government are exchanging sieges on their cross-cutting areas of domination. SDF is laying siege on some avenues in al-Hasaka city which are under the official government control, while the government is making the same on two avenues controlled by SDF in Aleppo. Russia tried to play a medium role (as usual) to solve the problem between the two parties, but it failed more than once until it made a progress the last Thursday. The disagreements between SDF and Damascus are multiple:
- in politics concerning the independence of the northeast;
- in economy concerning oil and wheat;
- in security concerning areas of domination.
While such disagreements accumulate, Turkey started a new military action against Kurdish armed groups (mainly PKK) in the north of Iraq and northeast of Syria. Turkey tries from time to time to confirm its position as a key player in the Syrian matter. President Erdogan described the goals of the operation using a very high tone saying that the operation will “break the heads of terrorists”. In addition to that, Turkey is trying to send a message to the Americans after a meeting that happened lately between General Michael Kurilla, the new commander of the US central command in the middle east, and Farhad Shaheen, one of the PKK leaders. The context of the Turkish operation is of significant importance because of two main reasons: the first is the forthcoming elections in 2023, and the second is the problem of refugees which came recently on the top of the internal Turkish debate between the authority and the opposition, while the two parts are using the refugee card against each other. It is interesting how both authority and opposition are uniting their statements towards the same goal, which is not only to return refugees to their country, but how to invest in such return politically by the opposition, and geo-politically by the authority.
The “self-governance” …by others
The ideology adopted by the Democratic Union Party (PYD) which represents the central political force of SDF is based on a soft copy of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) – although using the right of independence and liberation discourse rather than Marxist literature, which is the main source of PKK ideology. PKK’s basic project is to establish a Kurdish state which should be in hostility to capitalism. However, SDF – which is more flexible and liberal – suggests that the full political independence can be decreased from the dream of the state to a federal decentralized union, bearing in mind the example of Iraqi Kurdistan. However, because of the complexity of the Syrian problem and multiplicity of powers on the ground in addition to the dramatic events in the last ten years, SDF was ready to accept a minimum level (however quite significant) of independence which they name as “self-governance”, keeping the federal project for future. SDF went a long way in such direction through establishing governance institutions that gave it the ability to control the northern east for years. However, SDF governance experience cannot be described as successful, because the area suffers from very bad economic and social conditions, in addition to its arbitrary security practices, but SDF succeeded in keeping its dominance through the years regardless of the power tools that it used.
It was not always the case for SDF, so the question is: from where does it gets the courage to declare its “self-governance” and get a good international acceptance? The military accomplishments that SDF did by fighting ISIS and the American support gave SDF a big chance to be recognized as one of the main parts that have the right to contribute to the future of Syria after the war. Military accomplishments and the civil-liberal tendency that SDF claimed, made it able to hope for more independent governance, but without escalating the disagreements with Damascus, but keeping the tense relations under control, and this is clear in the official declaration of the Syrian Democratic Council (the executive branch of the “self-governance”) which says that it has no intention to contribute any separation project in Syria.
SDF is clear about its military and financial support from the US, but it knows implicitly that the trust in the US has limits, especially when it comes to US-Turkish relations, as the US always turns a blind eye to Turkish military operations against SDF, which forces SDF to maintain connections with Damascus and Moscow. The repetition of that scenario made SDF almost sure that it cannot depend on the US forever but still doesn’t seem to make any moves. And every time SDF feels an apathy from the US side, it starts to provoke using ISIS prisons and camps matter, which have thousands of former ISIS fighters and their families under SDF management, and remind the US of ISIS resurrection danger, thus, from its point of view, SDF is the qualified part that can handle the security in the area, but not for free. This card is maybe the last useful one in hands of SDF in its relations with the US.
However, what is Damascus’s point of view concerning SDF and its project? Damascus is very clear here, both the ‘self-governance’ and the federal project is unacceptable, and SDF is a separatist group that does not represent the Kurdish community, which incidentally contains a considerable number of Damascus supporters. In addition to that, Damascus claims that SDF is a mere instrument in the hands of the US to protect its interests. The only thing that Damascus and SDF agree on is that Turkey is an enemy, despite some security coordination at the level of intelligence from time to time between Damascus and Turkey through Moscow. However, some interesting positions were appearing lately from the Turkish side concerning the relations with Damascus, as the Turkish minister of foreign affairs stated that it is possible to deal with Damascus without recognizing its legitimacy, that is to say, if Turkey has to choose between a Kurdish state on its southeast borders, and normalization of relations with Damascus, then it will choose the second option as, from its point of view, “the lesser of two evils”.
What does the US have in mind?
The northern east represents the food and oil reservoir of Syria, a territory that we may call “beneficial Syria”. Moreover, its demographic composition in addition to the fact of its being a strategic intersection on the Iraqi-Turkish borders makes this area very significant for all the players. That the US achieved to establish themselves there at least temporarily may be as well Washington´s only “gain” during the whole Syrian war.
SDF and many other parts think that the main reason for the American presence in the northeast is oil and the support of the SDF project. While it´s true that the US administration has indeed reactivated the oil fields protection policy in the northeast, one of the motifs of being active in the region may be the ability to keep a close watch on Iran. In the same vein, the American presence in the northeast and on the Iraqi borders is making an obstacle in front of a very significant line from Iran to Lebanon through Iraq and Syria. In addition to that, the US is taking into consideration the option that a possible Russian regression in Syria caused by the Ukrainian war could be an opportunity for Iran to fill in the gaps.
The real US reason for supporting SDF is for using it as a card in the political game and as a part of an interesting idea that has been ignored generally, which is the idea of establishing a base for relative economic unity between Syria´s northeast and northwest. The goal of such an idea is to isolate the north from Damascus, which means to confirm the present geography as it is, and give multiple parties that are dominating the north a high level of legitimacy, in other words, to revive the idea of partition. Moreover, what is interesting is the quality of the parties in the north. We have SDF which controls the oil fields in the northeast, multiple opposition factions supported by Turkey in the north controlling smuggling roads (incidentally, they are fighting each other since the beginning of April), and Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) – previously al-Nusra Front, al-Qaeda’s branch in Syria between 2013 and 2016 – controlling trading and smuggling roads and having full economic and military domination in the northwest.
The US has started shepherding negotiations between SDF and Kurdish National Council (the Kurdish groups supported by Turkey) as an attempt to unite them in one line in the northeast, while Turkey – walking in the same American line – allowed HTS to impose its domination on many opposition factions – which were supported by Turkey – to unite the northwest. We should bear in mind the repeated Russian worries concerning the well-coordination between Turkey and HTS, which is true on the ground. HTS could not reach its economic independence – which is a fact – without Turkey. However, we should take into account a very significant and dangerous detail here, which is the recent promotion of HTS as the main power in the northwest after it eliminated all other opposition factions and united them under its banner. Moreover, HTS leadership started to establish some economic projects and achieved a level of stability in its areas. HTS is trying to promote itself as the guarantor of security through publishing reports concerning the decrease in crime rates under its rule, it is trying to say that ‘you can depend on us both in security and economy’.
So, what about the American idea to unite the north? or in other terms, to unite areas beyond Damascus´s control. Recently, SDF asked the US to exempt their area from sanctions, thus, as expected, Turkey asked the same for the northwest area. The US found in such demands a good opportunity to push all sides to talk and reach an agreement to isolate the north from Official authority in Damascus. Until now, the American inducements failed. Neither the Kurdish negotiations in the northeast nor uniting opposition factions in the north succeeded. Such failure manifests itself, among other things, in two main events: first, the burning of the Kurdish National Council offices and pointing an accusation finger toward SDF, which made the US condemn such actions which block the path of dialogue, and second, the continued fighting between opposition factions (always supported by Turkey) in the north.
At a first sight, the American idea looks like a very smart and useful pill to remove ‘the Syrian headache’ from the heads of administration in Washington. However, Moscow and Damascus can still make some moves to thwart such a plan.
The US embassy in Damascus has stated – on its Facebook page – its “concerns” considering the Turkish operation, and that the US “deplores any loss of civilian life”. The nature of such statements implies as much as turning a blind eye toward the Turkish operation. It is remarkable, in this context, to see how former US officials in Syria are describing the US position, for example, the assistant of former US special envoy to Syria, Joel Rayburn said that it is significant to make an agreement between Turkey and SDF, and such agreement requires a political decision at the level of the White House and the Ministry of foreign affairs, which seems not on the schedule of US administration. On the other side, in spite of the Ukrainian war, Russia increased its aerial bombardments on opposition locations supported by Turkey, targeting movable refineries in the north. The Turkish reaction to the Russian strikes was ending the Turkish-Russian open airspace agreement for military use. Is it a sign of a Russian-Turkish controversy? It is not that simple–it is only a game of tactics that requires mutual provocations and maintaining the game under control. Neither the US-Turkish relations will be damaged, nor the Russian-Turkish agreements will end, but as long as the Ukrainian war that overshadows the situation, it is possible for the same old actions to produce new results.
Conclusion
The US´s idea to isolate the north seems hard to apply. The US-Turkish disagreement concerning supporting SDF is still unsolved, and Turkey will not accept any form of Kurdish independence on its borders. In addition to that, the Russian-Turkish agreement in Syria could be always modified, but could not be broken. On the one hand, such an agreement has proven effective over earlier stages, and on the other hand, it has served Russian-Turkish interests more than any American suggestion. Russian-Turkish agreement in Syria could be the leading factor deciding the situation in the north, and the US presence represents the point of reference in such an agreement.
However, let us rethink one of the main parts on the ground in the north, HTS (al-Nusra). Isn´t it an irony that HTS can play the role of the security guarantor in the northwest? Isn´t it quite alarming to recognize another copy of ISIS? The hasty exit of the US from Afghanistan gave Taliban recognition de facto. Such an event gave a boost to other groups similar to Taliban – such as HTS – to think about recognition, and with some help from Turkey, HTS can be recognized.
Based on what has been formulated so far, we can say that the idea of uniting the north can be applied only under these – almost impossible – conditions:
- firstly, the US should give a strong guarantee to Turkey concerning the Kurdish independence matter;
- secondly, recognizing HTS as a local power;
- thirdly, uniting all forces, from SDF to other Kurdish parties, with the opposition supported by Turkey (or what is left of it);
- fourthly (and as a last – yet maybe the most important – condition), to get a green light from Russia.
In addition to this, we should still remember three substantial matters: oil, refugees, and Iran. How long will the US continue to protect oil fields under such tensions that do not allow a full production capacity? Can Turkey apply its plan to solve the refugees’ matter by planting them as a human wall on its borders? Is it acceptable for Damascus and Moscow? Does “self-governance” has a future, or it will be decreased to the level of only survival? All scenarios are possible, and whatever shall happen, Iran will be watching the situation from its locations in the east of Syria, and also from Vienna. With a nuclear deal, or without, Iran, only by its presence in the area, even if it does not make any move, will keep causing anxiety to the US.
Fouad al-Halabi is an independent analyst and commentator. He contributes with intermittent inputs of various kinds, occasionally commenting on selected topics, mostly related to Syria and its reconstruction as well as Near East´s and global challenges, news and events.
